Past, Present, and Future in the Global Expansion of Capitalism: Learning From The Deep and Surface Times of Societal Evolution and the Conjunctures of History by Lloyd, Christopher
79ÖZG 16.2005.2
Christopher Lloyd
Past, Present, and Future 
in the Global Expansion of Capitalism: 
Learning From The Deep and Surface Times of Societal Evolution 
and the Conjunctures of History.
Historia Magistra Vitae: Some Themes for Discussion
What of the present does anyone know who only the present knows? And what of 
the future can anyone know who does, indeed, know the past? Even as we come 
to understand that the present conjunctures, events, and processes we know and 
inhabit are but the moments of a deep, long-lived turbulent river of historical time 
that has brought us here, shaped all that we observe and experience and will carry 
us into the future, it affords us little knowledge of that future. The future (especially 
societal future) can exist in imagination but not within knowledge and so cannot be 
predicted with any absolute certainty. Nevertheless, as modern beings, we fervently 
hope to create it and control it and the desire to do so has grown, contradictorily, 
with the revolution of modernity. Modernity in the affirmative sense is above all the 
embodiment of the desire for freedom from control by traditions and by others1; at 
its most radical, it is the desire to be individually un-determined, to be in constant 
motion, to be escaping constantly from objectivity into absolute individual subjec-
tivity. To be ultramodern2 is to be avant garde, remaining continually at the horizon 
of creation of the future, an open-ended future without objective determination, 
free from the restraints of the past. To the ultramodernist, the traditional is to be left 
behind, abandoned, preferably forgotten, while the future is available for conscious 
creation, without limitation. This hubris is as dangerous as the teleological master 
narratives that it rejects.
That we are part of and living within the flow of historical time seems to be un-
derstood implicitly everywhere, even by ultramodernists, as a fundamental aspect of 
all human cultures. The ever-present existence of the past within material construc-
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tions, memories, legends, traditions, representations, has been integral to human 
existence for at least 30,000 years and perhaps much longer, and is one of the crucial 
features of humanity as a species. Reflections upon and representations of history as 
an exosomatic form of human consciousness and sociality has become increasingly 
important as societies, cultures, and knowledge have evolved. Consciousness of and 
representations of the apparent continuities of past and present and of future pos-
sibilities are fundamental to making us human. 
In all historical, evolving systems, history is determined above all by history itself. 
Novelty, the substance of historicity, can only emerge from the existing inherited situ-
ation. Social history is an emergent property and unintended consequence of social 
organisation and social reproduction through time. The inheritance of the past is 
what makes possible, and sets the limits, of the present and the future. There is always 
by necessity a path dependency in each natural domain, including the domain of hu-
man sociality. But this dos not mean that we go confidently into the future knowing 
which way ahead the path must lie for historical enquiry reveals the unpredicted cata-
clysmic and catastrophic ruptures and discontinuities that litter the way at uneven 
intervals as well as the continuities and dependencies that also guide us. To really 
know about the present is to know about the past and so those who would wish to 
understand, control, and ameliorate the present and project their desires upon the 
future have to learn how we came to be here. The study of the present and the future 
cannot be divorced somehow from the study of the past. Any lingering belief in a 
distinction between history and social science should be abandoned.3
The desire for a knowledge that penetrates beneath and then permits control of 
and transcendence of legends and traditions arose within those agrarian civilisations 
whose leaders wanted to transcend their own spatial, temporal, and even earthly 
limitations. A linear, teleological, and transcendent, rather than cyclical or apocalyp-
tic, understanding of social time came to the fore within late Classical civilisations, 
further developed within Judaeo-Christian and Islamic civilisations, and reached its 
apogee within modernity4. But late modernity (or ultramodernity) has also afforded, 
dialectically and ironically, the transcendence, in turn, of linear progressiveness and 
the possibility of its displacement by the non-linear, systemic concepts of evolution, 
chaos, and complexity. The discontinuities as much as the continuities, the transi-
tions, the ruptures, the contingencies, the path dependencies, the cycles, are all parts 
of this new understanding of the deep but very turbulent flow of time that we inhabit 
fleetingly in the present and which flows onwards on its largely unpredictable path. 
Historical understanding and knowledge today, from the standpoints of the com-
plexity and contingency of a post-imperial world, which is at last emerging after 
thousands of years, and the advances of scientific explanation that have come from 
the new evolutionary and systems theorising, teaches us important things, among 
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which is that linear projections are very likely to deceive us about the future. We 
have discovered that societal history, like geological and biological history, has not 
been a unidirectional process and there is no reason to believe it will be in the future. 
Nevertheless, the possibilities are not undetermined and causation is everywhere. 
The evolved and evolving structure of the social world can be investigated and we 
can come to know, ironically, the nature of contingency and the limitations of its 
possibilities.
Given this context and in order to explore the issue of historia magistra vitae, this 
paper tries to unite two interconnected themes. 
(i) The theme of la longue durée structural history of the world (to use Braudel’s 
term), concentrating on what I see as the central process of the past 500 years 
– the violent expansion of capitalism as an economic, cultural, and geopolitical 
system and especially the six kinds of wars that have convulsed, and continue to 
convulse, the world during the system’s rise to global dominance, universality and 
eventual probable transcendence. 
(ii) The theme of how the concepts of time, evolution, and structurism are able to 
provide the framework for analysis of long-run societal history and futurology. 
Understandings of past, present and future must be united by a social science that 
is able to reveal the deep as well as surface time of human social structuring and 
the forms of structured sociality.
Global Wars of Capitalist Expansion: Catastrophes and Continuities 
in The Long-Run of Global Geopolitics and Economics
In 1519 the Spanish conquistador Hernando Cortez landed his little army of Eu-
ropean freebooters and mercenaries on the mainland of the Americas. They were 
seeking to loot precious resources, especially gold, which could be converted into 
landed resources at home, to seize land in the Americas, and to enslave local popu-
lations to work that land for the benefit of the quasi-feudal conquistador class that 
was emerging from the conquest of the Caribbean islands. Land and slave labour 
were the keys to what happened subsequently. Confronting Cortez on the coast was 
a patchwork of small belligerent states owing various degrees of allegiance or hostil-
ity to the imperial Aztec state hundreds of kilometres inland in the central valley 
of Mexico. Through violence, negotiations, and guile Cortez constructed an allied 
army from the coastal peoples with which to confront the Aztec army of a hundred 
thousand warriors. Marching inland he eventually reached the wondrous lake city 
of Tenochtitlan. Splendid religious towers and palaces rose from the islands of Lake 
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Texcoco higher than any European cathedral in a city larger than any in Europe. But 
within two years through violence, tactics, deception, and disease, the Spaniards and 
their allies destroyed the great Aztec empire as a polity, a society, and a civilization. 
Soon the city was razed from the earth, the lake drained, and, thanks in part to Old 
World diseases, the splendours of central American civilization passed into history 
to be replaced by a new kind of mestizo civilization of Euro-American ethnic and 
cultural lineage. Isolated for so long from the mainstream of humanity, the peoples 
and cultures of the Americas could not resist the military technology and organisa-
tion, including gunpowder and wheeled vehicles, nor, above all, the biology of the 
Old World in the forms of micro-organisms, horses, and hunting dogs. Here was the 
catastrophic event that, with hindsight, we can see as marking the dawn of global 
history. Events like it were to become common throughout the world in subsequent 
centuries. 
Deep beneath the surface of such catastrophes and of everyday events of the social 
world, as with the events of the biological, geological, and cosmological realms, there 
are powerful, slow moving forces through time of which we are but dimly if at all 
aware. These forces sometimes starkly reveal themselves in mushrooming eruptions 
of cataclysmic events, such as the conquest of Mexico, the making sense of which is 
the fundamental task of scientific enquiry in all these domains. Enquiry into the deep 
time of society is no different in its basic tasks or even its basic methodology from 
that of geological, biological, or astronomical science. All are historical rather than 
experimental sciences, concerned to observe and explain the real, long-run processes 
at work. I shall return more explicitly to this issue in a later section of this paper but 
it is the basic theme that unites what I shall say. We can only make sense, I believe, of 
dramatic events like the conquest of Mexico or the European conquest and settlement 
of Australia or, in our time, the most recent of many conquests and re-buildings of 
Baghdad or the seemingly inexorable movement towards global free trade, within a 
larger and deeper framework of world history.
Looking back at the past 500 years many people, especially ruling elites and their 
ideologues as well as many of their anti-imperialist opponents, have been apt to read 
and interpret the expansion of capitalism and the construction of European empires 
as inevitable, leading necessarily to our present situation of the global triumph of 
western capitalism. But this is certainly not what really happened. By examining 
the violent history of the wars of capitalism we can begin to grasp the contingencies 
of capitalist expansion and ask about why capitalism survived and prospered and 
came to dominance. This is a somewhat different question than that of the classical 
theorists of European imperialism, who tended to concentrate on the more recent 
history and see imperialism as mainly a necessary economic function of industrial 
capitalism from the late 19th Century. In fact, organised, large-scale violence by Eu-
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ropean states was crucial throughout the five centuries; and at various vital moments 
the outcomes of conflicts shaped the history in unpredictable ways. Other outcomes 
of wars were often possible. Right at the beginning, for example, it was possible for 
the Aztecs to have defeated and vanquished Cortez’s army. But would the Spaniards 
have gone away, never to return? That was very unlikely for, if for no other reason, 
the European diseases, unleashed upon the peoples of the Americas, would not have 
retreated. In their wake, the Europeans would have returned, as happened in North 
America after the first Spanish incursions.
World or global history began to emerge, then, in the 15th and 16th centuries as 
contacts grew between the four great hemispheres of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the 
Americas. Hitherto there had been negligible interconnections. The great imperial 
civilizations of Afro-Europe and Asia in the 2000 years before 1400 CE had some-
times glimpsed each other across the vast oceans of water and sand and enormous 
mountain barriers separating the Mediterranean region and Asia but found the dis-
tance and terrain too great. Even those all-conquering central Asiatic cavalries of the 
Huns, the Mongols, the Tartars, and the Uzbeks did not weld together sustainable 
Eurasia empires. Europeans and Asians always retreated from each other in earlier 
times as so well exemplified by Alexander the Great, who turned back from the 
gate of South Asia, exhausted, temporarily he thought. (How different would world 
history have been had he survived, restored his forces, and resumed his eastward 
march?) American civilizations rose and fell in isolation from the others. But by the 
15th century CE, when a Eurasian-wide consciousness and trading system were finally 
emerging, thanks in part to the ever-adventurous Venetians, European adventurism 
began to eclipse the reticent adventurism of China, India, and Persia. 
The beginnings of the European outward thrust was on the basis of a fundamen-
tally new force in world history, an organisational and cultural force that over time 
has profoundly transformed the world, the lives of all humanity, and the very bio-
sphere in which we all live. That force is capitalism or, more precisely, the legitimised 
and institutionalised individualist impulse to accumulate economic power and wealth 
privately, as an end in itself, through the investment of capital in order to breed more 
capital. The emergence and protection of private property rights in land and other 
fixed assets was central. The systematic accumulation of wealth, out of trade, exploita-
tion, theft, plunder, and violence is a phenomenon much older than capitalism. The 
conversion of wealth into capital through private investment, the further accumula-
tion out of trade and later out of industry through the greater exploitation of wage 
labour, and, moreover, the institutionalisation of an economic, social, and political 
regime that supported capitalism, was new in the world in small areas in northern 
Italy and the Low Countries in the 14th century. It was not private investment that 
was new for there had always been small-scale investment in trade and handicraft 
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manufacturing in many parts of the world but the large-scale institutionalisation 
of a whole capitalist investment, production, and political regime based on private 
property rights and the thrust to geographical and social expansion that came with 
it was new. 
Such a large-scale development had not been possible to any significant extent 
within the imperial/bureaucratic structures of ancient or medieval Asia, the Middle 
East or Europe.5 Great private wealth certainly existed in all the states of the ancient 
and medieval worlds but the means of its acquisition, what could be done with it, and 
the institutional structure of its accumulation, agglomeration (to use Marx’s term), 
and investment, were all then non-capitalist or state and consumption oriented or 
at least subject to bureaucratic control over property rights. Imperial state power 
(usually intertwined with religious power) dominated wealth in all times and places 
hitherto.6 The breaking free by capitalists and private property from states from the 
16th century in Europe and their later control of states for imperialistic purposes was 
a great turning point in world history.
A crucial role was played in the development of capitalism by the peculiar con-
juncture in the 16th Century of Habsburg Imperial Spain, Protestant revolutionaries 
in The Netherlands, Resurgent Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam. This conjuncture 
reminds us of another, eerily similar conjuncture today between Imperial America, 
Resurgent Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam. This time it is Iraqis who are rebel-
lious against the empire rather than the protestant Dutch, and the Jewish people (via 
the Jewish state) are in the ascendancy rather than being either expelled from the 
Empire or helping to lay the foundations for Dutch economic strength through their 
migration from Habsburg Catholic Southern Netherlands to independent Protestant 
Holland.7
That earlier conjuncture was sparked in 1492 when, in that same year, the Chris-
tian reconquista finally succeeded in vanquishing the Moslem states of Iberia, Co-
lumbus reached the Americas, and the expulsion of the Jews and Moslems from 
the Habsburg Empire began. Catholic revanchism was essential to the conquest of 
Mexico for already Habsburg rule and influence was coming into question in Europe 
through the Protestant Reformation. New converts were needed. The Catholic Church 
was strongly supportive of the Spanish and Portuguese campaigns of conquest and 
forcible conversion and of the later savage wars against Protestants in Europe. 
It was not Catholic Spain, however, that reaped the long-term benefits of New 
World conquests after 1492. It lacked the capitalistic institutions and culture. Rather, 
the wealth flowed into and through the financial intermediaries of Europe based 
in Northern Italy and the Low Countries. The financiers and merchants of Milan, 
Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and other Dutch cities corralled the wealth 
and invested it to their advantage. Capitalism required large amounts of capital and 
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it came in part from non-capitalist sources to begin with (Marx’s original accumula-
tion of capital, a process essentially of plunder, which has been repeated in recent 
times within the former Soviet Union), which augmented existing surpluses from 
production and trade. The Capitalistic Protestants of the Atlantic maritime powers 
of Northern Europe – the Dutch, the Huguenots, the Danes, and above all, as time 
went on, the English, were the beneficiaries of the New World plunder, constructing 
both their own financial intermediaries as the means to establishing commercially-
based empires in the Americas and Asia and profitably investing the great increase 
in European wealth. 
Wars of Capitalist Conquest as the First of Six Kinds of Capitalist Warfare
Having seen off the Moslem Turkish threat at Vienna and Lepanto in the 16th Century 
and begun to exploit the vast wealth of metals, land, and labour of the Americas, the 
first great form of global warfare of Euro-Atlantic capitalist expansion had begun. 
This was an imperialistic campaign of conquest of cultures, environments, and, above 
all, of resources – land for large-scale commercial agriculture, minerals and later 
lubricants and fuels, and labour in the form of slavery on a vast new scale8. The ru-
dimentary beginnings of a world market for finance, goods, and labour appeared as 
did the beginnings of a merger of the biotas of the Old World and the New Worlds. 
Not since the heyday of the expansion of the late Roman Republic and the early Ro-
man imperium in the last century BCE was there such a combination of impulses for 
conquest. The vast medieval conquests of Arabs, Mongols, Uzbeks, and Mughals, had 
lacked one or more of these impulses. And this time, from the 16th Century, the vital 
new ingredient was the privatisation of empire. Cortez, Pissaro, Aguirre, and all the 
other Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, and Dutch conquerors acted largely on 
their own initiatives and in their own interests or of their corporate or noble backers. 
Their notional imperial commanders could not easily control these unruly agents, 
given especially the distances and communication difficulties.
The global war of conquest of resources by the expansionist Euro-Atlantic capi-
talists gathered pace through the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries and has not concluded 
even yet as we see with the oil wars of the Middle East in our time. The resistance in 
the Americas, Africa, and Oceania varied and in many places was relatively limited 
and in those places the conquest was complete and new forms of hybrid settler or 
mestizo societies emerged. This kind of global war of conquest was and is but the first 
of six kinds of warfare of capitalist expansion and resistance to it. These six kinds of 
warfare are peculiar to the era of capitalist expansion and endogenous to the history 
of capitalism in all its forms. But not all forms of warfare are peculiar to capitalism. 
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Indeed, warfare may well be endogenous to all societies. Whether it will remain so 
is an open question9. Organised violence probably arose as a consequence of ter-
ritoriality and ethnobonding by small, genetically-interconnected, human groups, 
which is as old as humanity in all its subspecies, if Chimpanzee society is any guide10. 
Societal formation on a larger scale and consciousness of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic 
boundaries, produced »natural warfare« over resources and cultural exclusiveness. 
The basis of such warfare persists and takes the forms of interethnic conflict, tribal 
blood feuds, and local territorial disputation. Another form of »original« warfare 
arose in ancient agricultural societies as a consequence of emergence and growth in 
inequality of social classes. Class warfare within and between classes has been more 
or less endemic in all societies since the rise of large-scale agricultural states. And 
those states also produced a third kind of »original« warfare – imperial conquest 
of agricultural territory. Once large states emerged out of local conflicts imperial 
expansion became the fundamental aspect of state policy for the conquest of new 
labour power and the land on which it worked was imperative for ruling elites so as 
to maximise the vast wealth and political and sexual power that imperial conquests 
supplied. The male socio-biological imperative to warfare seems clear.11 
The global wars of capitalism differ in some fundamental respects from all these 
»original« types of warfare but not in others. Expansionary capitalism by its nature 
has engendered its own violent geopolitics. Indeed, the wars of capitalism have con-
catenated such that as each successive form of conflict has emerged is has added to 
rather than supplanted the earlier imperatives to warfare so that by the early 21st centu-
ry all six kinds of warfare are present within the global system to some extent. Far from 
there being a Pax Americana, violence or its incipient threat has never been so wide-
spread since the end of bipolarity and the emergence of American unilateralism.
Inter-Imperial Wars of Hegemony
Having conquered most of the Americas and small parts of Asia and Africa by the 
mid 18th Century, a second kind of conflict within global capitalist expansionism 
broke out – the world wars between Euro-Atlantic imperial powers for global hege-
mony. The power of capitalists was now so great that they could use the imperial 
states to engage in a great arms race to defend the national interconnections between 
culture, capital, economy, state, and the imperial possessions. So crucial were those 
possessions that the state/capital/wealth symbiosis would be gravely weakened with-
out them. Colonial wealth underpinned the metropoles and their ruling classes, as 
the surviving grandiose imperial streetscapes of London, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and 
Amsterdam testify today.
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The leading capitalist imperial powers – Britain and France – having in the 17th 
and early 18th centuries neutred the Spanish, Austrian, and Dutch ambitions, now 
plunged into the first global inter-imperial struggle from the 1750s. By 1759, the most 
important year in this geopolitical story since 1521, Britain and its allies defeated 
France in Europe, North America, and, most importantly, in India. This victory could 
be attributable to the more advanced state of British capitalism and its interconnec-
tion with a modern state after the bourgeois revolutions of the 17th Century which 
aligned the state and capitalist interests before elsewhere in Europe.12 Thus began 
a new stage of capitalist expansion in which the leading powers not only fought 
each other across the whole globe but began the conquest of other great Eurasian 
empires. This global form of war – the war for hegemony between superpowers – as 
with global conquests of resources, has continued through many phases ever since, 
including the Napoleonic Wars, two phases of German attempts to rise to superpower 
dominance, a phase of Japanese ambition, and the Russo/American confrontation. 
The great losers were the old Asian empires of China, India, Persia, and Turkey.
We may be fairly certain that both these forms of capitalist warfare – for resources 
and hegemony – have now almost finally run their courses. Superpowers no longer 
have the capacity to dominate the world because the economic development, the 
global economic integration, the educated public opinion that capitalism has eventu-
ally brought to much of the world, and the proliferation of nation states, many with 
WMDs, make such wars unprofitable and unwinable abroad and unpopular at home. 
While this conclusion is taking some time to be grasped in Washington and Moscow, 
unfortunately, the failures of George Bush’s America and Vladimir Putin’s Russia 
show it clearly. The Age of Empires and imperial rivalries that lasted thousands of 
years is ending in the bloodied streets of Baghdad and Grozny. While unfortunately 
there may be another Baghdad or two along the way, anti-imperialism will win be-
cause the systemic capital/imperial construct has ceased to have material and moral 
and political coherence. American and Russian imperialisms are failing because they 
have met their matches in, ironically, the global financial and consumer goods mar-
kets, which demand geopolitical stability and free trade, as well as in the third form 
of warfare (nationalist resistance) and which, in these particular Iraqi and Chechen 
cases, is given added impetus by being allied with the fifth form (see below). 13
Wars of Nationalist Resistance and Liberation
The first and second kinds of global wars of capitalism – conquest of resources and 
superpower rivalries – have provoked in the conquered lands the third kind of war 
– wars of nationalist resistance and liberation. The idea of nationhood grew out of 
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that earlier violent conjuncture of Habsburg Spain, Catholicism, Protestantism, and 
The Netherlands. The Dutch Protestant revolt against the Habsburgs of the late 16th 
Century, the first recognisably modern war of national liberation, was the opening 
salvo in a process of national state and culture building in Europe that was cemented 
as a reality by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The idea of national sovereignty spread 
around the world and today is still a fundamental if tragic force, especially in an age 
of emerging globalism in other respects. The Euro-Atlantic imperialists provoked 
resistance everywhere they went and organised demands for liberation of ›subject‹ 
peoples, including even European settler colonial peoples, from European empires 
began to grow in the 18th and 19the centuries. The archetypical American War of 
Independence was inspirational in many places and still today the linguist nationalist 
project14 of uniting each ethné or culture within a single nation-state is underlying 
many bloody conflicts. The Iraqi and Palestinian resistances are no exceptions. The 
dying of imperialism will undoubtedly still be bloody and the violent dismember-
ment of multi-ethnic, colonially-created states in Africa, Asia, and Oceania seems 
set to be a continuing tragedy.
Class Wars Within Capitalism
A fourth kind of global war began dialectically within capitalism as its antithesis 
– the class war of anti-capitalist socialism. Capitalist industrialisation from the early 
19th century totally transformed the social and economic structures of the metropoli-
tan powers and made colonial possessions even more valuable for their resources. 
The new industrial socio-economic structures summoned into being a vast army of 
industrial workers in the core areas of the world economy and a vast army of agri-
cultural, mining, and transport workers in the colonised periphery. These working 
classes developed new forms of consciousness about their social contexts and, cor-
respondingly, new socio-political demands. Working class consciousness in the core 
became naturally anti-capitalist or socialist and sometimes revolutionary and in the 
periphery anti-imperialist nationalism coloured those elements. The conjuncture of 
electoral democracy, social welfarism, and universal education in the core states were 
a consequence of these conflicts. Social democracy arose there as a consequence of 
prosperity and the needs of advanced capitalism for science, technology, and man-
agement skills. 
The success of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions grew out of a powerful hy-
brid alignment of core industrial and peripheral agricultural working classes within 
a capitalistic world economy. Notwithstanding the collapse of Soviet Communism, 
class struggles and the social democratic project have not disappeared but lie some-
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what dormant in the face of the collapse of state communism and the current strength 
of the capitalist boom. But the history of capitalism certainly teaches that its periods 
of economic prosperity are interspersed with periods of depression that prompt its 
historically-specific regimes of accumulation to be transformed in an evolutionary 
manner15.
War of Islamic Resistance
Growing out of all the other wars of capitalist expansion is a fifth kind of conflict 
that has its roots at the very conjuncture of the beginnings of capitalist expansion in 
the 15th century – the War of Islamic Resistance. The power and virulence of Islamic 
Resistance to Western Capitalist domination comes from its complexly determined 
nature as being at once historically, nationalistically, and culturally antithetical to 
capitalism itself. Islam in its purist and most ascetic form is the last great non-capi-
talist material and social culture on earth. With its strong medieval roots in village 
agriculture, the town bazaar, petty commodity trading, and tribalist family structures, 
Islam remains in places and at heart a collectivist, inclusive, and totalising regime that 
has always had the capacity to motivate zealotry, especially against infidels. Unlike 
Christianity, it has not undergone the type of volte face of the 17th Century Protestant 
accommodation to and legitimation of worldly capitalism. Of course Islam is a many 
faceted culture with many degrees of and forms of observance and many philosophi-
cal traditions. The violent resistances we see today in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, 
Iraq, Indonesia, and Algeria, are all variations of a moral nexus drawn by radicals 
between anti-imperialist nationalism, anti-Christian-Westernisation, anti-individu-
alism, and anti-capitalism. Those radicals are having greater success in motivating 
resistance to Western penetration the greater is that penetration at the point of a 
gun in the wake of the September 11, 2001. The misnamed ›War on Terror‹ seems to 
be perceived widely within Islamic societies as a ›War on Islam‹ precisely because a 
real ›war on terror‹ would not in fact be fought by conventional armies, as Dyer has 
rightly pointed out16.
War of Environmental Resistance
The sixth and final global conflict of capitalism is rooted in the tragic nature of na-
tionalism and is also provoked by the beginning of the breakdown in the tense sym-
biosis between capital and the nationalistic state that emerged from the settlement of 
1648. That is, as capitalism has broken the bounds of national borders and developed 
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a completely globalising dynamic, a tendency that it always had, the contradictory 
desires by states both to control capitalism in the interests of national wealth and 
protection of dominant class power and to project state power outwards to dominate 
other states, has begun to undermine the original symbiosis. Globalised capitalism no 
longer needs national states in the way it once did and would prefer to be rid of their 
controls. But states are striving to remain relevant to global firms. One way they can 
remain so is to self-limit the extent of domestic control while trying to prevent the 
emergence of global governance that would undermine their sovereignty. 
Thus the tragedy of nationalism is that while it enables many people to break 
free from imperial domination, at the same time it prevents the emergence of a glo-
balised consciousness and ethic that are necessary to save the biosphere from the 
unchecked ravages of an unregulated global capitalism. The conjuncture of myopic 
nationalism and global capitalism is now destroying the planet. When certain lead-
ers say that their nation’s interests coincide with those of their domestic oil, coal, 
and timber corporations, which override those of all other people when it comes to 
global warming and environmental destruction, they are asserting a fundamentally 
immoral position. 
Against that position of narrow self interest that leads to environmental and so-
cial destruction an army of resistance is emerging that will, I predict, if continually 
thwarted and spurned by such political myopia, become a violent force that starts the 
last global war of capitalism. If this happens it will largely be a guerrilla war within the 
capitalist heartlands, reminiscent of the socialist class war. Indeed, it is likely that we 
will see a further convergence between socialism and environmentalism so that they 
become a single globally-oriented ideology. Many thinkers and activists, such as Peter 
Singer17, have been trying to affect that synthesis. But serious violence will probably 
not in fact occur. The development of globalist ideology, globalist alliances, global 
social movements, and global governance institutions out of nationally-based politics 
could bring about the required revolution. The dreams of internationalist movements 
for peace, worldwide solidarity, socio-economic reform, and global governance that 
seemed to be so powerful before the 1914-18 War at last could really be feasible be-
cause, paradoxically, of the globalisation of capitalism, the new technology of com-
munication, and the environmental and social limits of capitalism’s trajectory.
Historical Inevitability or Contingency of Capitalist Domination?
This sketchy story of the economic and geopolitical history of capitalism, with its 
cataclysmic events, conjunctures, and deep processes since the 16th century, is one of 
the interconnection of economic »imperatives«, with capitalist state power and resis-
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tances to it. A globalising process with many complexities, local variations, contin-
gencies, twists, turns, and disruptions, has occurred, which we can examine looking 
backwards from our present vantage point of an almost completely globalised world 
and try to grasp as a historical rather than teleologically unfolding inevitability. That 
examination, however, does reveal a certain path dependency and directional trajec-
tory. If human society is a chaotic system it does exhibit powerful attractors that hold 
the historical processes to certain paths within limits, but if it is pushed towards a 
different trajectory, some processes within chaotic systems are strongly directed by 
»runaway« mechanisms that pull them towards new equilibria quite different from 
prior states. Thus, using this kind of terminology, we can say, justifiably perhaps, that 
early European capitalism in the 16th century was in a highly contingent state and 
there were powerful countervailing forces that could have vanquished or contained 
it, and then perhaps throttled it, just as seems to have happened in Ming China 
and Mughal India. Once it had begun to break free from state control through the 
economic and imperial possibilities of the New World, the European capitalist so-
cio-economic system was able to move to a different trajectory that took on a certain 
degree of directionality in very broad terms. This would indicate that the »discovery« 
and conquest of the Americas was a really crucial development compared with the 
trajectory of Chinese adventurism of the 15th century. The new worlds of trade and 
plunder permitted the entrepreneurial class unprecedented opportunities to build 
their private capitalistic activities.18 Allied to this was the competition between 
various European powers, epitomised by the Spanish-Dutch-Portuguese rivalry in 
the 16th and 17th centuries for stimulation and control of private trading in the At-
lantic and Indian Oceans.19 Whatever possibilities of autonomous capitalist develop-
ment there might have been within Asia in early modern times, the penetration of 
European states (as opposed to small-scale merchant companies) in the 19th century 
seems to have had a detrimental effect.
The European ruling aristocratic classes soon recognised in many places the po-
tential benefit to them of the emerging capitalists and alliances were formed in several 
places, especially in northern Europe, but the aristocratic class generally refused to 
cede wholesale political power. State power later passed into the hands of the capital-
ist classes in various ways, including through revolutionary upheavals in many places, 
culminating in the French Revolution. But the continuation of capitalism itself was 
never in doubt during the aristocratic reactions to bourgeois pressure and absolutist 
impositions in the 17th and 18th centuries that prompted those revolutionary up- 
heavals.20 The historic compromises that often came out of those class struggles pro-
duced an early kind of quasi-capitalist state, especially in The Netherlands and Britain, 
that was able to project itself outward in ever-greater pursuit of imperial possessions 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century the more completely »modernised« 
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(in the sense of being devoid of vestiges of the aristocratic past) revolutionary states 
of America and Russia were able to dominate the world through their single-minded 
harnessing of the state-military-industrial nexus in the interests of geopolitical hege-
mony. Perhaps we will see a similar phenomenon in the 21st century with China or 
India but that seems unlikely for the reasons mentioned previously with regard to 
the growing untenability of imperialism in a multi-polar world.21 
From the viewpoint of the 21st century we can understand the last 500 years as 
exhibiting a punctuated equilibrium and also a broadly directional pattern. Warfare, 
economic growth, and global integration have been continuing features of this whole 
epoch but not following a smooth, unidirectional path. Enormous local variation 
and unevenness, long periods of stagnation in various places at various times and 
in many places today where capitalism has not revolutionised the material produc-
tion regime (except negatively) nor delivered material advances. Thus the history of 
capitalism has had both deep currents of continuity that have marked out a definite 
path for five centuries, which has resulted in the current global dominance as a whole 
system, and powerful currents of resistances and failures, which have produced the 
great uncertainty and unevenness in the system today. Triumphalism is hollow in 
the face of the Islamic resistance, the massive and worsening inequality of wealth 
and poverty, the social and environmental degradation of the many extremely poor 
regions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, and, above 
all, the looming global environmental catastrophe. The era of capitalist certainty and 
imperial triumph was very short-lived and is suddenly giving way to uncertainty and 
fear. The Islamic Resistance forebodes the possibility of other resilient resistances. 
The wholesale manipulation and domination of nature that capitalism has fed on is 
reaching its structural limitation and a new path will have to be found. What can this 
tell us about deep historical time in general and the possibilities of the future? 
The Deep and Surface Times of Society: Or What Might We learn 
From the Trajectories and Conjunctures of History?
The study of world history, largely as an antidote to western triumphalism and the 
overtheorisation of some historical sociology and historical economics, has grown 
in recent times. Many of the attempts to construct ›Big History‹ (in David Christian’s 
2004 term) have employed new master narratives22 that try to avoid somehow the 
old general theoretical concepts such as imperialism, capitalism, world system, and 
modernism, that grew out of the era of classical sociology and political economy in 
the 19th Century. In keeping with the consciousness of the era, a central theme in 
much of the new work is that of ecology; particularly the idea of energy balance in 
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the evolution of societies. While this is a positive development in general, the danger 
is that the events and conjunctures of socio-political history – the contingent ›surface‹ 
eruptions, catastrophes, and transitions in regimes will be overlooked in the pursuit 
of ›big‹ or ›deep‹ time alone. 
Deep social time is the subterranean current of fundamental historical forces that 
runs during very long periods beneath and intertwined with the relations, events, and 
phenomena of the social world and structures the lives of all persons. Deep time is 
›deep‹ because it is far ›beneath‹ or implicated within the visible surface of phenom-
ena and processes and very long lived in the structural sense. Various characterisa-
tions of what can be called ›deep social time‹ have been made in Smithian, Marxian, 
Darwinian, Weberian, Popperian, Braudelian, and Wallersteinian terms. Each has 
emphasised la longue duree of the rhythms, cycles, continuities, and discontinuities 
of production, sociality, and social structural creativity and reproductivity. 
The concept of deep time was coined23 to describe the geological and palaeonto-
logical processes of continuous, discontinuous, and ruptured yet unified very long 
history of forces, eras, phases, and variations in the natural evolution of the earth. 
In deep time, earth history is non-linear yet long lived and unified. The dialectic of 
continuous structural processes and contingent disruptions has produced a complex 
pattern in the present, revealed starkly on the surface in certain key places by recent 
process such as erosion, which we can understand and use to explain this deeper flow 
of temporal processes, events, and ruptures that links the long history, the present, 
and the future. 
The deep time pattern of geological history is theorised as a consequence of the 
shifting dynamic interactions between the forces of plate tectonics, surface crust/
magma interactions, bolide impacts, ocean currents, atmospheric forces, and bio-
spheric forces. The processes had a definite origin in the formation (out of a back-
ground of even older and more fundamental processes of the galaxy) of the solar 
system with definite parameters of mass, energy, and time. Once that background, 
those parameters, and that temporality are understood, the planetary forces of mass 
and energy and gravity form a foundation for all subsequent history. But they do not 
simply determine a linear path. The path is historical.
Similarly, the deep time of biology also contains the dialectic of structure and 
discontinuity in the history of speciation. Just as the great majority of past landscapes 
have disappeared under the grinding remorselessness of deep planetary processes 
and the cataclysms of violent events on the surface (such as supervolcanoes, con-
tinental rifts, and bolide impacts) so the historical record of life exhibits this deep 
connection between genetic and molecular continuity and a vast array of temporally 
specific forms, separated by structural ruptures on a fundamental level but joined by 
structural continuities on other levels. 
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The deep time pattern of biological history is theorised as the consequence of the 
dynamic interconnections between cosmological, geological, atmospheric, bio-ge-
netic, and bio-phenotypical structures. Once the simplest self-replicating molecules 
evolved on earth, lifeforms or species evolved very slowly within this highly contin-
gent context. Organic history is both delineated and enabled within this structure 
but not simply directed onto a linear path nor somehow guaranteed a necessary 
continuation. Several times in biological history the continuation of life on earth was 
in great doubt because of cataclysmic events. Recent discoveries about the history of 
planet Mars indicate that the environment of that planet has undergone such massive 
alterations over its history such that had they occurred on earth the continuation of 
life here would have been very problematic. On the other hand, once set ibn motion, 
as it were, life has developed a mutually interacting or feedback relationship with 
the inorganic environment of the planet such that the biosphere and the geosphere 
form parts of a larger system. Human social organisation with its material produc-
tion process, born out of a combination of instinct and consciousness, has over time 
become an important element within that system. 
The long-run history of socio-cultural formations, with their temporal specificity, 
is also connected at a deep level by social structural continuities that are delimited 
by the parameters of human social possibilities. Like the history of species, the his-
tory of societies can be conceptualised in evolutionary terms as having witnessed a 
long-term bushy patterning of societalisation throughout the Holocene. All human 
social orgnisation and institutionalisation has both produced and occurred in such 
a way as to leave this dense pattern that can be discovered and described by the his-
torian. No conscious understanding of the pattern of social structural consequences 
of social interaction has been necessary for humanity to produce the history but it’s 
only through the prism of social scientific understanding that the pattern reveals its 
meaning via the conscious uncoverings and imaginings of science. The real pattern 
thus revealed is the consequence of the enormously variable possibilities of interac-
tion between human socio-biology, human social experience, human consciousness, 
and the inherited social structural contexts of all social interaction and conscious- 
ness. 
Landscapes, species, societies, all have this dialectic of structural continuity and 
historical contingency and specificity. The conjunctures of history, where deep forces 
come together to produce crucial moments of change and discontinuity, exist in all 
these realms of the processes of the earth. Thus deep social time is not linear, not 
cyclical, not inevitable, not teleological. It is historical, structural, contingent, evo-
lutionary, and undirected over the very long run. It is not predictable because not 
unidirectional but it is discoverable and explicable because of the structural limita-
tions. We can build explanatory generalisations on various levels of abstraction. The 
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history of the social sciences is the record of the attempts to build these theories and 
their explanatory persuasiveness has increased throughout the past two centuries.
If deep social time is at once non-linear but continuous, non-teleological but di-
rectional in phases, how can this combination of features be theorised so as to explain 
the historical pattern and path? The historical sciences of the earth and of life have 
been able to explain the complex processes of their domains by generating theories 
that do posit processes without a subject and without teleology, but which are deeply 
caused by natural structural forces inherent within the very mode of existence of the 
substratum of their domains. Their explanations are of integrated systems. Seeking 
for and finding the hierarchical systemic modes of interconnection of the many forces 
within nature as well as the causes of system discontinuity or rupture have enabled 
the natural sciences to explain the histories of their domain systems. The same hope 
must animate social science quite explicitly if we are to take seriously the desire to 
really explain long-run social history.
The Contributions of Critical Realism, Structurism, 
and Systemic Complexity to a Historical Science of Society
Social science, then, in order to be a science akin to those of the earth and life, must 
search for the structuring forces that are the ›deep‹ causal contexts of social behav-
iour, social organization, and social evolution. The first requirement is to make the 
crucial ontological steps that all science has had to make – the adoption of a systemic 
and historical conception of the objects of enquiry. The positing of a systemic reality 
that needs explanation beyond the individual components that seem to constitute 
the system has been fundamental to all science. There is not the space for a detailed 
excursion into this philosophical argument but it is essential to point out that the 
adoption of a scientific methodology for social explanation does not mean the aban-
donment of humanistic understanding, as is sometimes erroneously asserted. That 
human behaviour and consciousness occurs systematically requires that it be studied 
as such rather than primarily as a problem within a discourse of morality, human 
empathy, and individual motivation and choice. That there are moral systems and 
individual choices does not make them the sole or even prime objects of enquiry. 
Systemic socio-biological relatedness and motivation is primary for the existence of 
humanity. The old science/humanities distinction is a false one that has bedevilled 
social, cultural, and historical enquiry and led many historians to wrongly believe 
that general theories have no place in historical explanation for there are no general 
structural continuities in history. Of course there is a basic contradiction within such 
a methodological presupposition since historical discourse is rife with putative and 
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elliptical generalisations that are poorly specified and conceptualised. Indeed, no 
social explanation can do without generalisations.
The domain of socio-behavioural science, one of the great domains of scientific 
knowledge along with those of astronomy, physics and inorganic chemistry, earth 
science, and biological science,24 has to have one or more foundational theories if prog-
ress is to be made in research. Theorisation of the other great domains has proceeded 
apace over the past two centuries and each is now more or less unified by theoreti-
cal consensuses about deep structuring forces even though much disputation about 
the details of theories persists within them. No such unity exists within the socio- 
behavioural domain. The construction of general theories is being attempted from 
several perspectives. There are several reductivist strategies that are trying to reduce 
social causation to individualist neurophysical and biochemical causation or to indi-
vidualist rationalist causation. There are also several realist strategies that begin with 
irreducible social relational structures as systemically emergent and build theories of 
the causal power of those relational structures. There is also the related systemic socio-
biological strategy of seeing society and behaviour as a complexly determined social 
structuring processes that combines human biological and socio-cultural forces. The 
leading recent theorists of this strategy are Boyd and Richerson25 and Runciman26. It 
can be argued persuasively that Marx greatly predated them in this concern to build 
a synthesis of social and biological sciences and he recognised the significance of 
Darwin to that project, something finally coming back to the fore now that Social 
Darwinism has faded from intellectual circles if not from political ideology. 
Critical realism is essential in two senses – firstly as the foundational idea that 
social reality consists of emergent real structures of social relations that have a caus-
ative power and which exist through time and space (ie that societies exist as real 
systemic entities), and secondly, the idea that the phenomena of the social world 
(ie individual and collective behaviour, including expression, social events, and the 
material products of social interaction, including the socially-transformed physical 
environment) have to be studied critically (not at face value or accepting the self-
descriptions of actors) via the use of theory and research as a means to uncover the 
›deeper‹ causal structuring forces at work. Those forces are psychological and social 
relational. Put another way, psychological and social relational structures must be 
studied and theorised as the means to explaining the nature, variety, and history of 
societies in all their scales and complexities of organization.27 Unfortunately, some 
areas of social enquiry have proceeded on the basis of a conception of social reality as 
being aggregates of individual behaviour and so the task is to examine only individual 
motivation and choice. This rational choice and individualist strategy for enquiry 
finds it impossible to deal with systemic social entities, such as families, institutions, 
classes and nations in any coherent manner. 
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The second step for a social science of deep time is to grasp the fundamental pro-
cess within society that links human and social forces – the social structuring process. 
This is the process that makes social life possible and therefore human life possible. 
Society is real insofar as there are structures of social relations into which everyone 
is born and which must be reproduced through social behaviour. The set of essential 
interconnections between social relations, social behaviour, social consciousness, and 
social reproduction, and the degree of fidelity and infidelity of the social reproductive 
process, is the site of social transformation and, ultimately, the long-run history of 
each society and of societalisation as a whole.
There has been an arid debate in the social sciences about philosophical meth-
odology, born, in part, of frustration and disagreement about specifying the fun-
damental nature of the object of enquiry There seems little doubt to me that the 
systemic nature of society requires an approach to investigating it that places the 
basic processes of the system as such at the centre. This means that methodological 
structurism must be the appropriate framework in which to connect critical realism, 
social theory, historical enquiry, and evolutionary theory of the deep time of society 
because it situates the science at the focal point of the social structuring process of 
human agential action that is the quintessential social reality. The social structuring 
process is neither an aggregate of individual behaviour nor a holistic, unanalysable, 
entity. Unlike all other animal social systems, human social systems are an ongoing, 
evolving, process of social structuring that makes society itself a historical process. It 
seems to make no sense to either abstract rational action from the total system and 
study that devoid of its systemic embeddedness or to study the system or any part of 
it as if it were not a process of historical complexity. A complex system is one with 
many levels, hierarchies, and facets of integration and cleavages of disintegration. 
Social systemic integration is on micro, meso, and macro levels and each level plays 
certain roles in the structure and regulation of the system. 
Human societies, then, are real, historical, complex systems of social structuring 
processes that change through time and do so because of the inherent processes of 
reproduction and evolution that occur within their normal functioning. In these es-
sential respects – systemic integration, historicity, and evolution – society constitutes 
a fundamental domain of reality upon earth and must have a science that is adequate 
to the explanation of those realities. Above all, it is the actual evolution of societies 
as systems that we must explain and which, once explained, affords insight into their 
possible paths into the future.
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The Ubiquity but Non-Linearity of Evolution
The idea of evolution has been growing in importance within western thought and 
culture for centuries. That things and systems change via the emergence of novelty 
from prior states is now taken as axiomatic even by many religious thinkers. This idea 
has a close connection with the idea of progress. Together these ideas are now central 
planks of capitalist culture and the ideologies of its dominance. But until Darwin, no 
good description of nor causal basis for understanding the evolution of life had been 
adduced. Indeed, Darwin’s revolution was in both the description of natural history 
and evolutionary theory. In the social domain, evolutionary concepts have been, in a 
sense, an ideological substitute for scientific thought about the mechanisms of evolu-
tion. No serious alternative to Neo-Darwinism as a general theory of social evolution 
has been proposed. Concepts of progressive developmental stages from supposed 
lower to higher forms of society have been used widely as an alternative to a genuine 
evolutionary theory. Such thinking is prevalent in the long-run economic develop-
ment literature, which cuts across the problematic of the history of capitalism in an 
unhelpful way. That is, the ubiquity of economic development (measured in material 
terms and abstracted from socio-institutional change) over the past half millennium 
as a ›progressive‹ unilinear path is sometimes assumed from the beginning in this 
discourse. The connection between that ›progressive‹ path, the violent geopolitics 
of the whole era, and the failure of the ›progressive‹ development to benefit (even 
materially) all or most of the earth’s people is little discussed within this narrow kind 
of literature. Insofar as that failure is discussed it is sometimes merely to assume 
that it’s only a matter of time before the benefits are spread to everybody, as soon as 
those ›undeveloped‹ areas can accept and adopt the necessary socio-institutional and 
cultural arrangements that the West is offering so enticingly.
A progressivist, often teleological, stages theory is no substitute for a scientific 
approach to the problem of social evolution. A scientific approach is one that eschews 
teleological assumptions of all kinds and focuses on the systemic, nonlinear and 
historical nature of the object of enquiry. The Darwinian tradition of theorisation of 
the evolution of life has within it two distinct but closely related objects of empirical 
enquiry – the evolution of each species and the evolution of all life such that over 
deep time there has been a vast number of species. How and why species emerge, how 
each evolves over time, and why they become extinct are the basic issues. Any ideas 
of progressive direction or unfolding of essences are absent from Neo-Darwinian 
theory.28 Deriving from this is the second order issue of why there has been a radia-
tion of species. That is, from a presumed beginning as a single species or at most a 
small number of different but similar species, life has evolved to produce a vast array 
of billions of species, more than 90% of which have died out completely but of which 
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many millions still exists. This can be accounted for within the theory by the idea of 
niche specialisation, environmental history, and the potential for adaptability, and so 
does not require the postulation of progress.
Analogous to this, we can say that the history of societies shows something of 
a similar, if much less vast, process of societalisation in the sense of a radiation of 
different societies, as well as a pattern of evolution within each society. Of course so-
cietalisation has followed a somewhat different course from speciation and the time 
frame is vastly different. One crucial basic difference is the possibility of a combina-
tion or fusion of societies, something that is not possible for species. Societies are 
consciously social as well as biological systems and that sets them apart from purely 
biological systems. The boundaries between societies and species are quite different 
in their significance.
Thus social evolutionary theory has two problems – the macro problem of soci-
etalisation in the very long run and the more specific problem of evolution of particu-
lar societies. The two problems are more closely intertwined for social evolutionary 
explanation than for biological because the merger of societies is a common phenom-
enon. Species, by definition, cannot merge to form a single species. Social boundaries 
are marked largely by blood relatedness, language, and culture, but also by geography, 
economic exchange and, in more recent times of human history, by institutions and 
especially by explicitly organized boundary protection via the use of force. Territorial 
instinct for human groups, an instinct common to all terrestrial mammals, is a strong 
determinant of social boundaries. The Pleistocene-Holocene process of societalisation 
is a process resulting from several related processes – colonisation of vacant land, 
social splitting, geographical separation, fusion of separate cultures, and internal evo-
lution of language, culture, and institutions of separated but once unified societies. 
Divergence and convergence over time produces a theoretical cladogram that has both 
features so that it forms a lattice-like pattern rather than the bushy pattern that we see 
with the evolution of species within particular classes and genuses. 
Evolution within a particular society produces a pattern of punctuated equilib-
rium over the long term. All societies throughout their history seem to exhibit this 
pattern of periods of relative stability interspersed with periods of rapid change. At 
times change can be so catastrophic that societies cease effectively to exist. Indeed, 
punctuated equilibrium seems to be a universal pattern in all long-run evolutionary 
processes29 that are caused by the internal dynamic between generative and structural 
levels of integration. The normal state is one of stability and fidelitous reproduction. 
When, for whatever contingent reason, large-scale or catastrophic change occurs 
within the environment or within the system itself, the system either successfully 
adapts by finding a new equilibrium state or trajectory, or collapses and dies. This 
is essentially a chaotic pattern through time in that systems have multiple possible 
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stable states around different points (or attractors) of integration and will remain at 
a particular point until radically disturbed or destroyed.
The generation of innovations within the dynamic between social reproduction 
and social structuring is responsible for such a pattern in social history. Social repro-
duction is the normal imperative of social behaviour but innovations also arise at the 
micro (or generative) level of agential behaviour (the only place where innovations 
can arise because only humans and not institutions are social agents). Innovations 
are a normal part of social behaviour. How and why innovations become selected, 
how and why they spread, and how and why they have certain consequences at the 
macrostructural or organisational level of the system are all empirical questions. The 
basic argument, then, is that humans behave in such a way as to be both the agents 
of social reproduction and the producers of social innovations. These behaviours are 
at once individually specific and collectively patterned. Innovations at the generative 
level have systemic (or phenotypical) level consequences depending on selection and 
propagation conditions. Those conditions are macro-organisational in terms of being 
relational structures that are rule governed systemic social and cultural networks, 
which in term regulate the individual and collective behaviour of all the agents within 
the system. Behaviour and organised systemic networks of social relations are im-
plicated within each other such as to form a dynamic social structure. ›Surface‹ and 
›deep‹ enquiry are both necessary.
Social structures exhibit a great deal of stability and must do so in order for hu-
man existence to be maintained. That is, human biological life is necessarily social 
life and requires social continuity at both micro and macro levels. Thus once a cer-
tain social structure comes into being it naturally has a strong path dependency in 
socio-institutional form because of social reproduction. The emergence of new social 
formations out of the large-scale historical events of European imperialism, such as 
the conquest of Mexico and Australia, and many similar events in the geopolitical, 
institutional, and economic history of capitalist expansion of the past half millen-
nium, have set in place societies that persisted in structurally continuous forms for 
centuries in spite of internal evolutionary processes. There have been many great 
burst of societal formation in various episodes of world history, especially at the times 
of imperial creation and disintegration in the past 500 years. 
Intervening in the Future
If social time is non-teleological, nonlinear, and non-progressive, what are the pos-
sibilities, ultimately, for any kind of certainty of knowledge about the future and thus 
for an interventionist ameliorative policy? What basis can there be for an optimistic, 
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progressive political and social program? Are social improvements possible? Indeed, 
is happiness possible in a world without the idea of progress? Of course modernism 
is centred on the idea of progress and it has become essential to our imagination and 
to our political ideology. There is no part of the world that is not in thrall to progress 
in one form or another, even if the idea is that capitalism will be destroyed. Progress 
is a highly subjective and contextual notion. 
But ameliorative change and improvement is not the same as progress in a teleo-
logical sense for improvement in societal arrangements is a matter for judgement 
about the possibilities of the flourishing of humanness under certain specific condi-
tions. The expression of happiness in any language is perhaps a good index of social 
improvement, as Layard30 has recently argued, but this implies nothing about the 
unfolding of a general human or social essence or some eschatological necessity. One 
person’s improvement is not necessarily another’s and the achievement of goals, es-
pecially of a material kind, rarely satisfies for long. The long-run history of capitalism 
is, in one sense, the universal generalisation to all humanity of the capitalist impulse 
for ever greater consumption and the resulting ever greater gap between desire and 
satisfaction.
On the other hand, there are also historical trajectories and path dependencies 
to guide our imaginings of what is ›over the hill‹, as the Duke of Wellington put it. 
Politics and policy should be the realm where historical social science and imagin-
ings come together but, unfortunately, as Wellington himself came to realise, the 
contingencies, conjunctures, catastrophes, and continuities of social change are not 
easier to control than the course of a great battle, which does unfold in a compre-
hensively understandable manner but only looking backwards, by the historian only 
and not to the participants. Knowledge of the systemic complexity, possible paths, 
and contingency of the past and present, and not hubris, must guide hope and reason 
into the future. At the moment hope should be declining, surely, for probable paths 
for humanity include massive dislocation of the sociosphere resulting from massive 
climate change as a consequence of ever greater industrialisation within the present 
fragile equilibrium of the geosphere. And hanging over us all like a doomsday threat 
are the world’s nuclear arsenals. It is difficult to judge whether past policies and be-
haviours with regard to their use produce hope or despair, especially in the light of 
Robert McNamara’s warnings.31 Against this, hope can attach itself to the tendency 
towards greater knowledge and understanding of the interconnected complexity of all 
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